Techniques, Technologies and Politics of Crisis and Post-Crisis Economics: Anglo-American Macroeconomics and Alternatives by Hass, Jeffrey K.
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Sociology and Anthropology Faculty Publications Sociology and Anthropology
12-2014
Techniques, Technologies and Politics of Crisis and
Post-Crisis Economics: Anglo-American
Macroeconomics and Alternatives
Jeffrey K. Hass
University of Richmond, jhass@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/socanth-faculty-publications
Part of the International Economics Commons, and the Political Economy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Sociology and Anthropology at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Sociology and Anthropology Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hass, Jeffrey K. "Techniques, Technologies and Politics of Crisis and Post-Crisis Economics: Anglo-American Macroeconomics and
Alternatives." Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta, Series 5, Economics 4 (December 2014): 5-27.
52014                     ВЕСТНИК САНКТ-ПЕТЕРБУРГСКОГО УНИВЕРСИТЕТА                     Сер. 5                    Вып. 4
ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКАЯ ТЕОРИЯ
УДК 330.3
J. K. Hass 
TECHNIQUES, TECHNOLOGIES AND POLITICS OF CRISIS AND 
POST-CRISIS ECONOMICS: ANGLO-AMERICAN MACROECONOMICS AND 
ALTERNATIVES
Th is paper attempts a critical appraisal of one core debate and theories in economics about the 2008 cri-
sis and post-2008  economic growth and stagnation. In addition to examining formal publications, 
this essay also examines serious blogs by high-profi le economists who are core participants in pub-
lic discourse over economic policy. Drawing on the general logic of economic sociology and political 
economy — in particular, an appreciation for more complex microfoundations of economic practice 
(e.g. power and culture) and institutions—this paper addresses three issues about theoretical frame-
works and claims about post-crisis growth or lack thereof: 1) Techniques: economists’ discourses focus 
primarily on techniques (policies and the like) available to the state and other actors for shaping eco-
nomic performance, but at the cost of lack of critical distance. 2) Technologies: economists’ discours-
es generally pay little attention to available institutional tools and techniques for aff ecting economic 
performance, which reveals limits to economic theory and theorists, as well as continuing pro-market 
hegemony in the discipline. 3) Politics: economists do comment on the politics of policy discussions 
and policies themselves, but politics ultimately remains exogenous to discussions, theory, and mod-
els — continuing a fatal weakness of economic theory that has been noted for decades. Th e paper then 
examines alternative frameworks grounded in political economy and economic sociology that focus on 
(and make endogenous) institutions, states and elites, logics of capitalism, and power, and concludes 
with possible propositions from these frameworks regarding crisis and post-crisis economics. Refs 76.
Keywords: 2008 crisis, macroeconomics, Keynesianism, Krugman, political economy, economic 
sociology, fi eld theory.
Дж. К. Хасс
МЕТОДЫ, ИНСТРУМЕНТЫ И ПОЛИТИКА В КРИЗИСНОЙ И ПОСТКРИЗИСНОЙ 
ЭКОНОМИКЕ: АНГЛО-АМЕРИКАНСКАЯ МОДЕЛЬ МАКРОЭКОНОМИКИ 
И ЕЕ АЛЬТЕРНАТИВЫ
В статье предпринята попытка критического осмысления дебатов и  теорий применитель-
но к  кризисной экономике 2008  г. и  последующих росте и  стагнации. Помимо официальных 
публикаций, в данной статье анализируются также блоги известных экономистов — ключевых 
участников публичного обсуждения экономической политики. В рамках общей логики эконо-
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6мической социологии и политической экономии, в том числе рассматривая глубинные основы 
экономической практики (прежде всего, власть и культуру), автор исследует три вопроса о те-
оретических основах и  свойствах посткризисного роста или отсутствия такового: 1)  инстру-
менты: дискуссии экономистов сосредоточены прежде всего на имеющихся в  распоряжении 
государства и других субъектов инструментах (политики и т. п.) для воздействия на экономику 
в ущерб критическому подходу; 2) методы: в спорах вокруг экономики обычно недостаточно 
внимания уделяется институциональным инструментам и методам воздействия на экономику, 
что ограничивает применение экономических теорий и мнений ученых, а также способствует 
доминированию про-рыночного направления в экономической науке; 3) политика: экономисты 
комментируют политику при обсуждении инструментов экономического регулирования, а так-
же сами инструменты; при этом политика всегда остается некой данностью (endogenous) в дис-
куссиях, в теории и в моделях, порождая фатальную слабость экономической теории, что видно 
на протяжении десятилетий. 
В этой связи в статье анализируется альтернативная парадигма, основанная на политиче-
ской экономии и экономической социологии, предметом которых являются (и таким образом 
становятся эндогенными) институты, государства и элиты, логика капитализма и власти. В за-
ключительной части статьи в рамках данной парадигмы даны предложения, касающиеся кри-
зисной и посткризисной экономики. Библиогр. 76 назв.
Ключевые слова: кризис 2008, макроэкономика, кейнсианство, Кругман, политическая эконо-
мия, экономическая социология, теория поля.
1. Contentious Claims about Post-Crisis Economics
Th e crisis of 2008 and its lingering eff ects on employment, investment, trade, and the 
like are among the worst global economic downturns since the Great Depression, yet schol-
arly analyses are far from reaching consensus over this economic event. Its roots, its nature, 
and thus its solutions are contested within and between disciplines — oft en due to politics 
as well confl icting models and underlying assumptions about relevant variables, the nature 
of human practice, and cause-eff ect relations. Within the Anglo-American economics pro-
fession, one dividing line in analyses and policy prescriptions vis-à-vis the 2008 crisis and 
growth has been between “austerians” who worry about government debt and infl ation, and 
more traditional demand-side Keynesians (even if they adopt the identity of “new Keynes-
ians”), who point to a liquidity crisis as the core to current sluggish recovery. Yet missing in 
this debate is a serious consideration of structures and institutions — the very social forces 
that drove analyses in classical and contemporary political economy1. Th ere are loosely 
related alternative approaches from economic sociology and political economy (political 
science), drawing no small inspiration from the work of Karl Marx and Max Weber. While 
political scientists and sociologists have not ignored the roots and dynamics of the 2008 cri-
sis and policies and dynamics of the post-2008 “recovery” (to the extent there has been any 
stable, signifi cant recovery), scholars in these disciplines have been far less vocal or innova-
tive in using their theoretical tools to examine the crisis and that which came aft er.
In this paper I use a combination of formal academic papers and less rigorous but 
still important and provocative blog posts form important economists, to examine the dis-
course and theoretical logics in the economics profession. I will constrain this discussion 
to the Anglo-American sphere of the profession for two reasons. First, restrictions on space 
limit the scope of discussion. Extending the discussion beyond Anglo-American discourse 
would mean not only bringing in even more voices and citations; it would also mean ad-
1 One exception is demography, i. e. the distribution of people across age groups, which has been in-
voked in “secular stagnation” hypotheses [Teulings and Baldwin, 2014]: i. e. weak demographic growth means 
slowing demand and eventual stagnation, with growth relying on investment bubbles.
7dressing alternative traditions that have suffi  cient diff erences from Anglo-American dis-
course [Fourcade, 2009], while also sharing suffi  cient assumptions and logics; disentan-
gling similarities and diff erences, while also being aware of institutional and historical 
variation, would require a small book at the least. Second, the Anglo-American tradition, 
arguably, forms the core of the global economic discourse. American and British universi-
ties have enjoyed good material resources (even recently) to develop quantity and quality of 
academic talent, as well as to facilitate research and publications that shape discourses. As 
well, important economic organizations — the IMF and World Bank, various UN bodies, 
and private organizations (think tanks, analytic divisions of major banks, etc.) — tend to 
recruit students of American and British universities. (Note this is not a claim to superior 
validity of Anglo-American economics2.)
In this paper, I will begin with a brief discussion of basic claims and debates within 
the Anglo-American wing of the economics profession. From this, I will suggest that the 
main thrust of economics discourse is an analysis of policies and techniques — i. e. what 
states should do with an economy (e. g. lower taxes or more redistributive policies; more 
or less use of fi scal tools; and so on). However, such accounts take for granted technologies 
and politics of crisis and post-crisis policies (or policies in general). If techniques involve 
how to use a tool, technologies involve the tools themselves — including possible alterna-
tive tools to those presumed in economics. Politics, of course, involves the structuring of 
power to use tools or to prevent their use, or to create new tools. Unfortunately, in econom-
ics discourse technologies and power are given short shrift , to the extent they are operative 
concepts at all. In contrast, political science and economic sociology make technologies and 
politics central: for example, class. 
Th eoretical content for this paper  — which is empirical material for an analysis of 
ideas — comes from a set of publications, some landmark and others chosen through key-
word searches from JSTOR (so akin to a content analysis), and from general content of 
blogs by economists important in the academic world and as emerging public intellectuals. 
For sake of space I will not cite every blog post consulted, unless necessary; of this essay, I 
summarize the aggregate content of blog posts by these authors3. Originally I intended to 
analyze economics discourse more closely, but constant reading of that discourse convinced 
me that Krugman, Wren-Lewis, Mankiw, and many others were skirting around issues cen-
tral to alternative analyses of economic forces, practices, dynamics, and growth: namely, 
insights from political economy (classical and contemporary) and fi eld theory4.
2 Some economics discourse outside the Anglo-American world (e. g. in Russia) gives more weight to 
“history” and “culture,” although how and why “history” and “culture” matter as causal or mediating forces 
is not always so clear. Because these other discourses allow more conceptual room for structure, culture, and 
the like, one could argue for merging such scholarship with political science and economic sociology, akin to 
an advanced version of nineteenth century political economy. I also leave out behavioral economics from this 
discussion. First, this scholarship has been distant from broader discourse of crisis and recovery. Second, be-
havioral economics puts the cart before the horse — examining behavioral foundations of economic practice 
without suffi  cient grounding in cognitive psychology, which should provide basic foundations for any social 
science.
3 Th is means replication and verifi cation are possible. One can read the blogs of Paul Krugman, Simon 
Wren-Lewis, Brad DeLong, Gregory Mankiw, and others to check veracity of my claims. 
4 Note that these models presume a stable geopolitical environment. When international confl ict 
emerges, politics tends to trump economics, and all bets are off .
82. Economists’ Visions of Techniques of Growth, or, IS-LM and All Th at
Within the economics literature and blogosphere, one important current debate over 
post-crisis growth and stagnation concerns whether stimulus packages or austerity meas-
ures should be implemented. For austerians, the real problem is public and private debt. 
Th e wisest approach is to reign in government spending and restrict the money supply, 
reducing the threat of infl ation and reducing government competition for existing capital. 
Th is should, in theory, help businesses borrow to produce, trade, and sell, and get the econ-
omy back on its feet. Indeed, thinking along these lines was behind Reinhart and Rogoff ’s 
[2010] infamous warning about high government debt relative to GDP: stimulus packages, 
fi nanced by state debt, would only worsen an already bad situation5. Better to give market 
actors the freedom to decide as they see fi t, and the best way to help said actors is to keep 
government debt low and avoid infl ation. (Such a policy might sound familiar — it was 
the basis of “shock therapy,” which was not particularly successful on its own for reasons 
beyond the scope of this paper.) Reinhart and Rogoff ’s errors (coding errors, data omis-
sions, etc.) are well-known enough not to warrant further comment; these called into ques-
tion one leg of the austerity thesis, that using public debt to fi nance stimulus packages is 
inherently dangerous. In a parallel logic of sparing markets from social forces and eff ects, 
Mankiw [e. g. 2013], see also: [Cochrane, 2009; Mankiw, Swagel, 2006] has resisted claims 
about systemic inequality and the possibility of causal relations moving in both directions 
between inequality and the 2008 crisis and nature of post-crisis policies and recovery. Ro-
goff , Cochrane, and Mankiw, among others, continue to support a “market sanctity” thesis: 
markets will clear and reequilibrate, and markets are best left  to their own devices to main-
tain effi  ciency, growth, and even meritocracy.
Opposing this view are proponents of Keynesian theory and Hicks’ famous IS-LM 
curve as adapted from Keynes, as well as the issue of liquidity traps at the heart of the cur-
rent economic malaise. Market mechanisms and relations have a negative side that supply-
side and similar models cannot easily account for or even articulate — for example, the 
possibility that a market economy and core fi nancial institutions of its support can generate 
incentives that lead away from stable growth or recovery6. Th e current champion of the 
IS-LM/liquidity trap thesis, Paul Krugman, has shown in his New York Times blog that 
comparative data reveal that the liquidity trap thesis holds up; that in fact austerity hinders 
rather than aids economic recovery; and that the threat of infl ation was overstated by its 
detractors (Cochrane in particular). (Krugman has not been alone in his endeavor — Si-
mon Wren-Lewis [2014a] has been active in his blog and scholarly publications pushing 
the same general line of analysis and policy prescription — but with a Nobel Prize and the 
New York Times behind his name, Krugman is the more visible leader of this Keynesian 
analysis.) Th ose who identify with “freshwater” economics, in contrast to “saltwater” eco-
nomics7, and are closer to Keynes in their analysis, tend to take liquidity traps and IS-LM 
5 Note that Rogoff  himself, citing Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia and Mauro [2010], admits that the zero lower 
bound is important and that raising infl ation targets would be a good idea in theory, although if it would not 
work in practice [Rogoff , 2014].
6 I leave aside the Austrian school, whose supporters oft en claim not to like fi nancial institutions such 
as central banks. While the Austrian school has provided useful insights, the sacralization of market relations 
blatantly injects ideology into what should be cold-hearted analysis.
7 Th e general diff erence between “freshwater” economists (at inland universities, such as the University 
of Minnesota) and “saltwater” economists (in universities on the coast, such as Princeton) is that freshwater 
9curves more seriously. In this interpretation of the 2008 crisis and economies, the current 
problem is one of insuffi  cient demand and the “zero bound” of the liquidity trap. Krugman 
[1998a] is perhaps the most famous economist in this camp, and through his blog for the 
New York Times Krugman has used IS-LM to propose that Western economies are at the 
zero bound, and so there is little that traditional monetary policy can do. Instead, according 
to Krugman, reasonable policy would include a greater stimulus and a shift  in central bank 
behavior so as to alter expectations among consumers and those in the business community 
(see also: [Reis, 2009]). Regarding stimulus, defi cit fi nancing at present is not as perilous as 
unemployment and low demand; with interest rates close to zero, this is the time to borrow 
to encourage employment and consumption. Regarding expectations, Krugman [1998a] 
has argued that businesses are discouraged to spend because they fear an imminent rise in 
interest rates to combat expected infl ation — a reasonable expectation, given that western 
central banks have been overly fearful of infl ation since the 1970s. Instead, argues Krug-
man, central banks should allow a higher degree of infl ation and in fact act in opposition 
to the usual rules of conservative, measured, careful policies and policy statements. In this 
way, fi scal policies (e. g. public works) over a longer period of time would have the desired 
eff ect of raising demand and bringing an economy out of recession and stagnation more 
quickly. Krugman has also gone as far as to suggest that saving can contribute to a stagnant 
recovery [Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012], and in his blog he sometimes suggested that 
savers be punished: if the problem is low demand, then hoarding cash does little to help 
anyone. Rather, there should be a disincentive to save too much — perhaps taxes on sav-
ings over a certain amount, with taxes collected pumped back into the economy via public 
works or other state-led consumption. 
In his blogs and scholarly work (e. g. [Krugman, 1998a, 1999; Eggertsson and Krug-
man, 2012]), Krugman makes two basic and simple propositions. Th e fi rst is that at the zero 
lower bound, monetary expansion and fi scal policies that prime the economic pump will 
not lead in the short-term to rising infl ation. In fact, unless such government spending is 
directed towards consumption — public works, for example — then fi scal expansion will 
not do much. Earlier, Krugman [1998a] even suggested that public works spending might 
have little eff ect anyway — but this was based on one study of the American Great Depres-
sion that is far from accepted as Truth. Further, Krugman [2009] has since suggested that a 
large stimulus package was essential to maintain demand and employment, so as to avoid 
the zero lower bound and defl ation, with its problem of central banks facing the dilemma 
of “pushing on a string” (i. e. incapacity of policies to encourage behavior). A corollary to 
this proposition (or perhaps its mirror image) is that austerity will act as a drag on a return 
of economic health. In his blogs, Krugman admits that, barring further economic catas-
trophes, a sick economy will eventually improve, but this could take quite a bit of time and 
lead to continuing economic pain. A second, and related, proposition, is that to facilitate 
economists demand macroeconomic models be strictly grounded in assumptions of microeconomic behav-
ior, such as instrumentally rational action. Saltwater economists claim macroeconomic models can be built 
without such strict assumptions. First, macroeconomic models can be deduced from a few basic principles, 
such as price and wage stickiness, and then revised from empirical tests. Second, following Samuelson, Krug-
man suggests the macroeconomic context (institutionally vague) can shape actors’ interests, expectations, and 
behavior. Of key consequence for us is that saltwater economists have an easier time using IS-LM curves be-
cause they do not require immediate microeconomic foundations, and the validity of macroeconomic claims 
can be judged based on how well models predict. (However, without theoretical mechanisms or microfounda-
tions, explanation is problematic and grounded usually in vague assumptions such as “rational expectations.”)
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emergence from recession and the zero lower bound, central bankers must start to defy 
expectations of obsession with low infl ation and price stability — rather, central bankers 
should show that they will not raise interest rates as soon as the specter of infl ation can be 
imagined (let alone appears in the fl esh), and instead will allow prices to rise. If interest 
rates remain low, businesses and banks will increase borrowing or lending, and purchases 
and production, for there will be less fear of being caught with higher interest to pay on 
debts and thus exposure to greater fi nancial risk. (In Krugman’s words, central bankers have 
to appear to act irresponsibly.)
Drawing on general data relating government purchases and austerity policies to 
change in GDP, using data from the IMF and other sources — in particular, comparisons 
between policies and economic outcomes in the United States and the European Union — 
Krugman [2012; 2013; 2014a] suggests that the greater the austerity, the slower the recov-
ery. Granted, this focuses on only one variable — degree of monetary expansion — and the 
crisis of the euro, incomplete economic integration, and various political factors must be 
considered. Th e direction of causation is not entirely clear from the basic data, and many 
important political variables remain exogenous — a point to which I return below. Simon 
Wren-Lewis [2013b; 2014c] claimed much the same, with diff erent kinds of data about 
American and European economies showing the same basic negative relation between aus-
terity and recovery or growth. Reviewing Japan’s “lost decade” and the years before and 
aft er the American crisis, Chow and Foster [2010] come to similar conclusions: namely, 
that both Minsky’s and Krugman’s claims have some support from empirical data. A related 
debate has concerned such policies as extended unemployment benefi ts, pitting Europe-
an-style welfare or extraordinary extension of short-term American benefi ts. In the pro-
market perspective (e. g. [Barro, 2011; 2012]), extended unemployment benefi ts warp the 
labor market and slow recovery, as the unemployed have less an incentive to seek work at 
whatever wage is possible. From a more Keynesian perspective, a crisis in demand — which 
is what the post-2008 crisis has been — extended or generous unemployment benefi ts will 
have little negative eff ect on the labor market or labor productivity — and if anything, un-
employment benefi ts should stimulate demand and aid recovery. It seems that the evidence, 
once again, has been on the side of the Keynesianists [Krugman, 2014d]; also: [Casselman, 
2014; Rothstein, 2011], in the United States and Europe — where economic stagnation has 
less to do with welfare expenditure and more with a crisis in demand exacerbated by the 
European Central Bank’s austerity policies.
In sum, it seems that Krugman’s Keynesian analyses fi ts data about recovery and infl a-
tion better. However, why this is the case is still not entirely clear. Do Krugman et al have an 
accurate handle on governing dynamics of capitalist economies, or economies generally? 
Are Krugman and those in his camp explaining rational behavior of a large group of market 
actors — investors, fi nancial elites, bank consultants and employees, small business owners, 
average consumers, etc.? Or does IS-LM hold (in this case, at least) because actors with rel-
evant knowledge and position (resources and decision-making authority) play by a shared 
set of rules and work within a linked set of institutions, such that suffi  ciently shared frames 
of reference allow for expectations and policies to play out as Krugman et al suggest?8 
IS-LM and other curves presume actors — but who are these actors, and what are their 
8 James Galbraith’s [2002; 2011] discussion of the 2008 crisis raises such questions. For Galbraith, the 
2008 crisis resulted from fi nancial elites’ unconscionably risky and even immoral (or criminal) acts and policy 
responses are a function of elite power and interests.
11
interests, ideologies, and resources9? IS-LM is an admitted problematic interpretation of 
Keynes’ model, and everyday institutions, practices, politics, and ambiguity are missing. 
Even Krugman must assume too much rationality — and when that rationality does not 
show up (e. g. mainstream economists and politicians refusing to face the evidence that 
their policies are not working, or central banks only taking timid steps towards altering ex-
pectations about infl ation and monetary policy), we have a problem in the model. Perhaps 
the problem is a sin of omission. But what is being omitted — and might this lead in diff er-
ent directions regarding the nature of economic shocks, crises, and recovery?
3. Techniques versus Technologies of Economic Policy
What is interesting about the debate within economics is the focus on techniques — for 
example, stimulus packages to improve demand, versus austerity measures to reduce risks 
of infl ation and to reduce risks that government debt “crowds out” private investment. Yet 
what is missing from economics discourse now has been kept on the margins for decades: 
namely, institutions, culture, and power. One can see this in an interesting “tribal war” 
between freshwater versus saltwater camps in macroeconomics (i. e. grounding models in 
strict microeconomic assumptions, versus allowing more ambiguity in microeconomic 
behavior), interpreting liquidity traps as fl eeting or transitional versus more structurally 
grounded and longer-lasting [cf. Palacio-Vera, 2010], or the feasibility of fi scal versus mon-
etary policies. While the “Lucas critique” and Minsky’s [1986] work suggest that institu-
tions might aff ect behavior through means other than instrumental calculation of material 
incentives — a broader position long accepted economic sociology and political science — 
the rational actor and rational expectations, and insuffi  cient conceptualization of institu-
tions and power, plague mainstream economic discourse and models. Some economists 
suggest the crisis of 2008 — and the inability of many in the economics profession (outside 
an innovative minority) to notice impending disaster — was due to ignorance or dismissal 
of broader systemic factors. One study suggested that economists “should stop neglecting 
money, wealth and debt, and turn away from an individualistic view and toward a systemic 
view of the economy” [Bezemer, 2011: 1]10. Krugman, again, has been critical of the lack 
of refl ection in mainstream economic theory aft er 2008 (including policy recommenda-
tions that theory might suggest)  — for example, the problem of models in professional 
(American) journals having to fi t preconceptions of “normal” economic behavior rather 
than seriously engaging empirical data, and perhaps by extension expanding the analysis 
of social forces underlying economic practice. As he noted in one blog entry critical of the 
“new classical” model of economic theory grounded in microeconomic assumptions (e. g. 
rational expectations).
You might have expected both the 2008  crisis and the years of poor performance that 
followed — years in which new classical types made massively wrong predictions, while people 
who remembered IS-LM did much better — would have changed this a lot. But remember 
9 Even Krugman [2009] seems to admit this is a valid point when he claims the “shadow banking sys-
tem” contributed to the 2008 crisis and problematic recovery (and future crises). Concrete actors and institu-
tions matter — but they have no room in a model that is far too abstract and broad.
10 Note that a focus on “money and wealth” does not mean restriction to, say, asset bubbles (e. g. [Van 
Lear, 2010]. Rather, this suggests a focus on concrete institutions that shape the fl ow and use of fi nance, and 
the structured distribution of wealth [Dhami, al-Nowaihi, 2011].
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that new classical macro fundamentally elevated microfoundations above empirical success; 
so orthodoxy largely brushed aside empirical failure [Krugman, 2014e].
Many economists were loath to question preconceptions despite data revealing 
otherwise:
In the 80s, as I said, this [new classical synthesis] was proved wrong, and the whole 
enterprise should have been reconsidered. But by then you already had a self-perpetuating 
clique that cared very little about evidence and regarded the assumption of perfect rationality 
as sacrosanct — if you weren’t assuming that, you weren’t doing real economics. So the eff ects 
of events were asymmetric: the 70s led Keynesians to adapt, but new classicals shrugged off  
the 80s, just as they are shrugging off  the Great Recession [Krugman, 2014e].
Wren-Lewis [2014d] suggested that Keynesian models did not need rational expecta-
tions assumptions that supporters of microeconomics demanded11. Th oma [2014] claimed 
that business cycle theory has problems with information costs: there is no market clear-
ing for information asymmetries. In short, something is wrong with foundations in main-
stream economics. Yet in noting this and championing a neo-Keynesian approach, Krug-
man et al fall into similar traps.
Another way of framing one critique is to accept Krugman’s claim and evidence that 
fear of infl ation blinds us to the real dynamics of crisis and recovery, and that austerity is 
the wrong policy to employ. Krugman then asks throughout his blogs: if the evidence sug-
gests austerity does not work very well, and infl ation has been middling at best, then why do 
many other economists twist and turn evidence and arguments to deny this — and why are 
politicians even worse? Why deny the “truth”? On several occasions Krugman has posited 
that the real issue is class power. Yet this raises a few dilemmas for Krugman’s own frame-
work. First, this leaves politics and institutions exogenous. We know the techniques to get 
us out of crisis and stagnation — yet we cannot employ them. Th is implies that economies 
are embedded in other social dynamics, such as politics. Second, ideologies on their own, 
outside of class interests, might be at work as well. Cochrane et al might not be support-
ing class allies on Wall Street; they might actually believe their dogma to be Truth (and 
this would not be the fi rst such case in history). For example, defenses of neo-Friedmanite 
monetarist approaches to liquidity traps and the crisis of Japan and the United States are 
mathematically impressive (e. g. [Buiter, 2005; Williamson, 2012], but the general obsession 
with monetary policy analysis trips up on the fact that this approach has not fared well in 
explaining crises in Japan and the United States and problems of recovery.
Put diff erently, the actor with rational expectations in an economics context (standard 
theory) seems to disappear elsewhere. We must be non-rational outside economic contexts, 
rational inside. Yet this is a muddled view of human practice as we know it; humans do not 
compartmentalize to that extent. Th us, the economic models and claims of many econo-
mists and politicians are embedded in something bigger: fi elds, institutions, and classes.
11 Piore and Sabel [1984] use a Keynesian analysis appreciative of institutions and structure to do that 
which many economists claimed Keynesianism could not do: to explain 1970s stagfl ation.
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4. Technologies, Politics, and Th ose Missing Concrete Institutions and Actors
What stands out for this Simmelian “stranger” to the economics profession12 is the 
absence of serious consideration of institutions and social structures. In one blog entry, 
Lars Syll [2014] criticizes IS-LM analyses as too basic and having no sense of institutional 
nuances or the concrete, “real” movement of commodities or capital — the kind of stuff  in-
stitutionalists in other disciplines tend to take seriously. Krugman’s [2014b] response is that 
such macroeconomic models at least provide some insights on what to expect in particular 
macroeconomic settings, e. g. likelihood — but not precise probability — of infl ation aft er a 
stimulus package when an economy is near the zero lower bound. I fi nd this unconvincing 
theoretically and intellectually — this is a theory with weak mechanisms or concrete sense 
of cause and eff ect, i. e. correlation rather than causation. Furthermore, general economics 
discussions of “growth” tend to focus on general, but still vague, aggregate measures  — 
GDP, unemployment, and the like. Yet today “growth” includes concrete issues: not only 
raising employment and reducing debt, but also attaining sustainable development in a 
context when demand alone might raise us out of recession but increase carbon output 
and increase threats to humanity’s well-being from climate change. Vague “growth” is no 
longer an option. One defense could be to invoke positivism: start with basic assumptions 
and identities, and follow the math towards insights and predictions that can be tested. If 
the predictions hold, the model has validity for the moment, and the search for mecha-
nisms can proceed separately [Krugman, 1998b]. Indeed, it was through formalism and 
a positivist approach that Einstein developed his general theory of relativity. Yet Einstein 
as a philosophical realist was concerned about a formalism that did not uncover realities 
driving observed phenomena [Isaacson, 2007]; excessive formalism can restrict scholarly 
inquiry as to how and why observations actually occur13.
A constant criticism outside the economics profession is that economists’ models 
do not take institutions and structures seriously or keep them exogenous (e. g. [Haggard, 
1990; Wade 1988]. Economists can come close to institutional analyses when they invoke 
increasing global fi nancial integration, foundations of asset bubbles, or portfolio move-
ment [Claessens, Dell’Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven, 2010; Leila, 2011; Kilinc et al., 2012; Veld, 
2013]. Yet institutions are seldom opened up to inspection — even Krugman admits that 
banks and fi nancial institutions are more than generic fi nancial intermediaries in the grand 
scheme of money fl ow. Th at this institutional arrangement can have a signifi cant impact 
on economic adjustment is beyond question [Swagell, 2009; Saull, 2012]. Even pointedly 
institutional analyses in economics — e. g. “law and economics” or “new institutional eco-
nomics” of Oliver Williamson [1975; 1985] — have a fairly restrictive conceptualization of 
“institutions” and “institutional eff ects”14. Arguably, dominant economic theory, i. e. the 
Anglo-American variety, takes as its institutional context an abstraction of the American 
economy, without considering concrete institutions that make this economy operate as it 
12 I. e. an individual close enough to a particular group to interact with its members but distant enough 
to avoid being trapped in its assumptions (e. g. toeing some ideological line). 
13 Take chemistry. Experiments mixing various chemicals did aid human progress, but once quantum 
mechanics uncovered how and why chemical bonds do what they do, experimental designs — and progress 
in medicine, industry, and so on — fl ourished more.
14 Some famous economists have taken more nuanced approaches to institutions: Douglass North, Am-
artya Sen, and the late Albert Hirschman and Mancur Olson readily come to mind. Arguably they have had a 
greater intellectual impact outside economics, in other social sciences.
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does. As well, there are only abstract, generic “actors,” instead of concrete actors in rela-
tional positions (e. g. class). Who really thinks carefully about infl ation targets and cen-
tral bank interest rates — average consumers, or specifi c fi nancial elites, consultants, and 
other institutional gatekeepers?15 Yet various studies outside economics have shown that 
some institutional constellations are quite good at promoting innovation or, alternatively, 
triggering crises [Evans, 1995; Helmke, 2010], and that diff erent forms of state-business 
relations and policies can be equally productive: sometimes successful in similar historical 
periods [Dobbin, 1994], or successful in one period but not so in another [Haggard, 1990]. 
Import Substitution Industrialization was successful from the 1930s until the 1960s, and 
then faced debt problems; Export Oriented Industrialization seemed predominant aft er the 
1970s but ran into its own problems when the global market faced shocks. Th ere is no uni-
versal “best policy,” yet general models such as IS-LM cannot diff erentiate. Finally, capital-
ism itself tends to generate crises that have institutional foundations. Minsky [1986] noted 
this, and Harvey [2005; 2010; 2013] has expanded on Marx’s classic analysis to suggest that 
contradictions inherent in capitalist institutions and capitalism’s requirement of increasing 
returns inevitably leads to crisis — not so much crises borne of working class solidarity 
and protest, but rather fi nancial contradictions that invariably explode into recessions and 
depressions. And environmental “ecocide” is catching up with us and with capitalist institu-
tions that stress making profi t in ways that rely on consuming fi nite natural resources in a 
fragile global environment we are ruining by the day.
Th is raises an important theoretical distinction: that between techniques and technolo-
gies. A technique is a particular way of doing something; tools involved are assumed as 
given. Technologies are those tools, which can be constructed, deconstructed, or revised. An 
institutional analysis is an analysis of technologies (the constellation of existing tools) as 
well as techniques (how they are used). Comparative political economy and economic soci-
ology are essentially about histories and variation in the construction and use of technolo-
gies. Th ese approaches do not always take GDP, employment, or similar measures as objec-
tive, universal indicators of economic “success.” Indicators of positive economic develop-
ment depend on how “development” is defi ned by those who stand atop institutions. Does 
“development” mean higher GDP, or does it mean strategic control of important resources 
and increasing state power, as one could argue is a prime logic of the political economy of 
Kremlin siloviki [Hass, 2011; 2012]?
Neoinstitutional Field Th eory
One possible approach uses fi eld theory: business organizations are organized into 
fi elds of fi rms with perceived affi  nity (usually output, e. g. auto manufacturing, or consumer 
durables). In fi eld theory [DiMaggio and Powell; 1983; Fligstein, 1990], owners and man-
agers focus as much on each other as on consumers and suppliers — perhaps more, for 
their peers are not just competitors but also sources of information about the “normal” and 
“legitimate” way one conducts business. In his study of the twentieth century American 
15 In a similar logic, Rogoff  [2014] claims central banks will not raise infl ation targets because they 
would lose credibility before “the public” that would then distrust them. Why “the public” would distrust 
bankers who learn from experience (infl ation targets set too low) is bizarre, and who “the public” is — and 
whether “the public” in America follows central bank policy and has real power — remains obfuscated via the 
abstract, generic “rational actor.” If fi nancial elites lose faith in central bankers or challenge policies, raising 
infl ation targets might fail. But this moves us from abstract, generic actors to social structure, including class 
interests and power.
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economy, Fligstein focuses on “conceptions of control,” i. e. standard organizational strate-
gies and structures that fi eld leaders impose on other members of the fi eld and that are 
dependent in part on the legal framework in which these fi rms act. Fligstein proposes his-
torical conceptions of control: cartels and price wars to maintain price stability (price wars 
as punishment for those fi rms that undercut competitors’ prices and destabilize production 
and sales); a manufacturing conception of control, in which fi rms focus on production of 
a particular output; a sales and marketing conception of control, in which fi rms expand 
output to avoid competition and bring in income from various sources (thus reducing risk 
from the collapse of demand for one product); a fi nancial conception of control, in which 
product output is far less important than fi nancial markers (such that steel fi rms can enter 
the oil business, which was unheard of before the 1970s); and a share value conception 
of control, in which corporate strategies and structures are grounded in short-term share 
value, rather than fi nancial criteria (e. g. strict measures of costs and expenses from diff er-
ent activities) or actual output.
Using this model, Fligstein proposes an interesting hypothesis about the duration of 
the Great Depression. Rather than a problem of a zero lower bound, the gold standard, 
monetary policy, or other standard explanations, Fligstein suggests that the dominant man-
ufacturing conception of control made it diffi  cult for fi rms to emerge from stagnant pro-
duction and sales. For example, Ford Motors focused on production and output, and thus 
stuck with the Model T. However, as aggregate demand suff ered in the American economy, 
Model T sales suff ered — and so did Ford’s future. Th e manufacturing conception of con-
trol did not allow managers to consider using varied output to stabilize income. General 
Motors, it turned out, stumbled into a new model that stressed varied output, with diff er-
ent cars targeted to diff erent classes. Cars for better-off  Americans continued to sell, which 
helped General Motors maintain production and innovation. American fi rms reoriented 
strategies and structures to the GM model, and the sales and marketing conception of con-
trol emerged. Th is allowed American fi rms to improve market positions and contributed 
(but did not determine) emergence from the Depression.
Until the present, that is. In the most recent conception of control, corporate strategy 
and structure focus on short-term value of stocks and bonds and the use of complex fi nan-
cial technologies to move money, not necessarily products, around. In short, this is less a 
manufacturing economy than earlier. Th is new conception of control also required liberal-
ized fi nancial markets and tools, which the American government provided. Eventually — as 
Minsky might have predicted — this bred contradictions that exploded in the housing bub-
ble and fi nancial catastrophes of 2008. However, in this new conception of control, reliance 
on fi nancial tools to measure the worth of business practice means businesses are loathe to 
expand too quickly, simply because they are not focusing on consumers and demand of a 
particular set of products as before. Th e newest conception of control is built on short-term 
fi nancial evaluations for maximum fi nancial gain, such that any short-term risk is amplifi ed 
in the eyes of investors, ratings organizations, and managers16. Th e manufacturing and sales/
marketing conceptions of control had a longer-term vision, and short-term risk and loss was 
not so important. It seems that the recent spate of bubbles (1980s S&L crisis, dot-com bubble 
of the late 1990s, recent real estate bubble) suggests that fundamentals of economic practice 
16 Additionally, this adds structure to Minsky’s model of pitfalls of stability — underappreciation of risk 
seems decoupled from broader social forces, e. g. institutions, discourse, etc. In a fi eld framework, the framing 
of risk can be modeled to explain how it is perceived concretely.
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shift ed from neo-Keynesian policies and practices of slow, managed, but stable growth of the 
post-war period to a riskier and less predictable global economy that rewards the 0.1% and 
leaves all else to suff er fallout from risky investments gone bad.
Contemporary Political Economy of the State
Fligstein’s model tends to focus on fi elds of business actors and keep the state at some 
distance; the state as actor basically sets general rules of the game (e. g. constraining mo-
nopolies or cartels). Th is is due to Fligstein’s focus on the American economy, in which the 
state plays a relatively distant role. However, a comparison of state-business relations and 
politics reveals other possible forms of technologies, that in turn might infl uence a “way 
out” or lag on economic recovery. Here we return to classic political economy of Karl Marx 
and Max Weber (among others) with recent revisions, in particular regarding the variable 
role of the state and state-business relations. Two works are of particular interest here. First, 
John Zysman’s [1983] analysis of responses to the oil shocks of the 1970s revealed that some 
forms of fi nancial relations and technologies worked better than others in extricating econ-
omies from stagfl ation. Th ose economies in which the state was central to fi nancing and 
for which state offi  cials and technocrats were well trained were able to shape and fi nance 
business restructuring so as to reduce energy costs and produce goods that conformed to 
new demand in the era of higher oil prices. For those countries in which banks play central 
roles in fi nancing and thus in devising new strategies — for banks then had representatives 
on boards of directors in return for long-term loans — recovery also did not take long, 
as long-term strategies predominated over considerations of short-term costs and risks. 
Countries relying on fi nancial markets and autonomous fi rms did not fare so well, for there 
was no concentrated search for strategies that optimized the health of individual fi rms and 
the entire economy. France was Zysman’s empirical example of the state-led economy and 
recovery; Germany provided a bank-led example; Japan was an interesting combination of 
the two (where state and business work closely devising long-term strategies, and the state 
and keiretsu banks provide long-term fi nancing). Th e United States and Great Britain were 
examples of market-led restructuring that did not emerge from the oil shocks so easily.
A second approach is that of Peter Evans [1995], who posits various forms of state-
business relations can led to diff erent degrees of “embedded autonomy,” i. e. a situation in 
which states are simultaneously embedded in economic relations to understand real busi-
ness needs, but also have suffi  cient distance and autonomy so as to negotiate policies that 
work both for businesses and the public. States too autonomous can be predatory (many 
African countries) or ineff ective in promoting useful policies (India). States too embedded 
are captured by business interests and end up defending elites’ gains (the United States, 
much of Latin America). Th e perfect balance, Evans claims, enabled South Korea and Japan 
to develop optimum strategies for development: the state defended domestic fi rms against 
foreign competition (imports) but forced domestic fi rms to compete with each other and 
with foreign fi rms in foreign markets. However, such a condition requires the conjuncture 
of several important historically contingent dynamics. First, a state must have suffi  cient 
autonomy and insulation from society (especially elites) so as not to be captured. Th is re-
quires a civil service that is well educated and compensated, with high status and high 
requirements for entry. Th is also requires that the state have its own resources for shaping 
policy and discourse, for example social scientists working within the state rather than 
for private “think tanks.” (Europe and Japan tend to have such states.) However, the state 
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cannot be too insulated; networks must exist between state offi  cials and private elites. Elite 
education at a small set of universities can encourage formation of such networks: Oxford 
and Cambridge in the United Kingdom, the Grandes Écoles in France, University of Tokyo 
(Japan) or Seoul National University (South Korea). (Note that American Ivy League uni-
versities tend to send alumni into the private sector.) Such networks can facilitate dialogue 
between the state and business, such that economic development can be long-term and 
oriented not only to profi t but also to investment in sectors from which the entire country 
would benefi t. Th is goes some way to explaining the rise of Japan and South Korea from the 
ashes of World War II. Finally, the state must have suffi  cient resource control, for example 
signifi cant fi nancial resources (Japan, South Korea), but not so much as to be overbearing 
(as in socialist countries). 
One problem with this model is not its analytic power, but its sense of pathos. Op-
timal state-business relations are not easily created: state attempts to guide the economy 
elsewhere have ended in capture by the state or shortsighted policies resulting in eventual 
crisis. Such were the dynamics of state-led growth in various Latin American countries by 
the 1970s and 1980s. State-business relations can also hide possible corruption or deeper 
institutional problems, as has happened with corruption among South Korean chaebols or 
the real estate bubble and troubled bank fi nances in the late 1980s that were kept hidden 
and eventually led to Japan’s continuing economic troubles. (Th at markets are imperfect 
does not mean states are perfect.) It seems that one pathway to such a state-business bal-
ance is being in a diffi  cult geopolitical situation — a business elite weakened by previous 
war (Japan, Korea) and a state forced to focus on economic growth to survive geopolitical 
competition (East Asia, also Germany in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries). But en-
gineering economic greenhouses, state-business balance and relations, and growth through 
experiencing war and geopolitical duress seems a diffi  cult path.
A third approach is that of Michael Piore and Charles Sabel [1984], who argue two 
points. First, post-war economic institutions and policies were infused with Keynesian rec-
ommendations, but only imperfectly. Concessions to labor unions and welfare programs 
aided stability and growth in consumer demand and stabilized sales and profi t. Constraints 
on capital availability and mobility, and constraints on business expansion, ensured slower 
but steadier growth and the avoidance of fi nancial and asset bubbles, as well as a focus 
on production over speculation. Stocks of oil, food, and cheap labor — all of which were 
disturbed in the 1970s — could act as buff ers against sudden needs for these inputs, aiding 
price stability overall. Second, Piore and Sabel argued that there have been two basic forms 
of production, mass production and craft  production. Mass production involves standard-
ized production and output so as to gain economies of scale; large investment in technology 
is required, and deskilling of labor might emerge as a result. Mass production can produce 
enormous output and profi ts — but it requires, above all, stability in prices of inputs and 
demand. Craft  production retains a skilled labor force able to adapt to changing consumer 
demand or macroeconomic context. Th e focus is on smaller batches of specially produced 
goods — e. g. gourmet food versus mass produced McDonald’s hamburgers. Th e drawback 
of craft  production is that large-scale output and profi ts are not so possible, given the reli-
ance on people and not machines. Yet fl exibility can be a powerful advantage. Further, in 
craft  production, skilled workers contribute to the process of innovation, as they have more 
experience with the nuances of their product and production and have greater voice vis-à-
vis engineers and managers to suggest improvements in output or production.
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In their analysis of 1970s oil shocks and recovery, Piore and Sabel note that countries 
with craft  production — namely Germany and France, but also Japan — were able to adjust 
their processes of production to reduce energy costs and to address changes in consumer 
needs and tastes more quickly, and thus emerge from the oil shocks more quickly. Th e 
United States had a harder time recovering, given the centrality of mass production. Entire 
industries, such as steel, were gutted quickly and replaced by mass services. Th is intersects 
with Zysman’s argument: autonomous, mass producing corporations did not have craft  
fl exibility to cope with oil shocks, and they were not directed by state technocrats or bank-
ers. Th e result was deindustrialization and a shift  to craft  production in high-tech — and a 
longer time reinvigorating the economy.
Political Economy of Class Power
No discussion of political economy would be complete without some reference, even 
in passing, to legacies of Karl Marx and Max Weber: fi elds, states, and other institutions 
“act” as used by elites and classes. Yet within much mainstream analysis, class power and 
contradictions of capital are downplayed. While we can debate the validity of these tech-
niques, other forces might make techniques irrelevant. While ideologies and interests are 
exogenous to much formal theory or are admitted on the sly17, these might be too impor-
tant to be left  aside. Note how Krugman has recently turned to a rudimentary class analysis. 
While austerity and reducing debt have not led to economic improvement, the only reason 
Republicans have fi xated on these was to dismantle welfare programs for class interests and 
ideologies — the very thing undergraduates in political science and sociology could have 
told the Nobel laureate long ago. Krugman [2014c] also suggests that fi nancial experts criti-
cized quantitative easing because it threatened defend their interests (rapid movement of 
capital) and their ideology. Wren-Lewis [2014b] and Smith [2014] chimed in with similar 
observations: fi nancial experts’ policy prescriptions were no better than those of right-wing 
politicians and many in mainstream economics (e. g. Mankiw, Cochrane), because of egos 
and status as well as alliances and interests — which points to class. Th at this should be a 
surprise to Krugman or others, at least publicly, suggests weaknesses of exogeneity in his 
framework and in much economics. Th e problem with even Krugman’s enlightened ap-
proach is threefold, and telling of shortcomings in mainstream economics. First, Krugman 
invokes ideologies and interests in an ad hoc manner to explain why correct Keynesian poli-
cies have not been adopted; yet ideologies and interests have no real place in the rational 
expectations foundations of standard theory. Second, the mainstream approach presumes 
a “public” of consumers and entrepreneurs who really do think as rational actors looking 
ahead to monetary policy or who even have the know-how to think about this. Knowledge 
and frames of interpretation, which cognitive psychologists assure us are far from straight-
forward, are just missing in mainstream models and even in behavioral economics. Finally, 
the public of consumers and entrepreneurs are not homogenous and certainly not atom-
ized and free-fl oating. Rather, they are embedded in social relations such as class, race, or 
gender, which help shape ideologies, identities, and interests.
17 Mancur Olson [1982] did admit, in a footnote, that class ideology and identity might matter in the 
British economy. Yet observations from his experience in the UK did not make it into his analysis.
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Two important scholars in the tradition of political economy of class are G. William 
Domhoff  and David Harvey.18 Taking Marx seriously has been one of Harvey’s goals, and 
his recent book [Harvey, 2014] is the culmination of years of hard thinking and lectures on 
applying Marx’s insights — drawn from observations of early nineteenth century capital-
ism — to the situation today. Harvey is not very optimistic about the human condition. 
While capitalism can be dynamic and innovative — Harvey does not deny this potential in-
herent in capitalism (and neither did Marx) — this particular set of institutions and institu-
tional logics contains seeds of recurring crises. However, unlike Minsky, Harvey locates the 
source of crisis not in individual actors’ bounded rationality, but rather in structures that 
make capitalism operate. In particular, capitalism tends towards an imbalance between ac-
cumulation and investment or returns on investment; if the former is greater than the latter, 
then capitalist elites (owners of property), pursing the logic of accumulation, will turn to 
additional tactics that are ultimately self-destructive. In particular, techniques and technol-
ogies that reduce labor costs might bring innovations, but they also deskill or cause pain in 
shift ing labor markets — and if welfare policies for redistributing wealth are too weak, then 
the accumulation of capital leads to a majority of any population with decreasing wealth 
for consumption. Th e result is recurring crises in demand — recessions or depressions, like 
that crisis we have recently faced and continue to face. At the same time, a small sliver of 
the population, the ruling elite, sees its wealth increase by a staggering amount. And just as 
average wages in the developed world have stagnated, elite wealth has growth precipitously. 
Inequality, reliance on bubbles to sustain accumulation, reliance on taming states and 
reducing labor costs and labor power are the ingredients for economic contradictions that 
periodically fl are up. Th ese contradictions might be temporarily mitigated by state policies 
that defend labor or redistribute wealth  — for example, Keynesian and welfare policies 
from the 1930s to the 1970s — but eventually these too will succumb to accumulation and 
the power of elites, who have managed to increase rent-seeking behavior as well as defend 
neoliberal ideologies that still guide Western policies — not only austerity, but defense of 
private property and keeping a tamed state at arm’s length from the sacred “market.” Finally, 
while elites see their wealth grow, we might have entered a period where labor markets 
remain tight, wages stagnant, and an unemployment rate of perhaps seven percent to be 
a new norm. Meanwhile, states have adopted increasingly militaristic means of defending 
“public order,” whether kettling and similar tactics in Great Britain, expanding surveillance 
in the United States, or rule by law rather than rule of law in Russia. Capitalist institutions 
generate crises and an elite (with feet in the political as well as economic realm) that de-
fends those institutions, to the detriment of the rest of us. Unless a fundamental shift  in 
ideologies, policies, and institutions arises contingently — and this would require revolu-
tion — economies will recover eventually to the benefi t of elites. Yet now, with environmen-
tal disaster looming, the days of capitalism could be numbered, due less to popular protest 
than contradictions between humanity and nature.
While Harvey focuses primarily on institutions and institutional logics — with actors 
following capitalism’s imperatives of accumulation and control — sociologist G. William 
Domhoff  [2013]  argues that actors and institutions coexist and interact: one shapes the 
other. Just as the rise of corporations and corporate boards gave rise to “interlocking” rela-
18 Piketty’s [2014] recent and potentially “groundbreaking” work — which doesn’t say much new but 
does provide rigorous analysis — came out too late for this paper, but from my reading of initial reviews, it 
buttresses class-based political economy.
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tions that drew elites together and created a stronger corporate, class identity, these elites 
then proceeded over time either to limit the eff ects of state policies vis-à-vis capitalist power 
and profi t, or hijacked states and state policies to increase their own wealth. To understand 
elite power in the United States, Domhoff  uses such measures as “Who wins?” (whose inter-
ests are served or institutionalized in policies) and “Who gains?” (variation in profi t from 
policies). Domhoff ’s thesis is straightforward: unless there is a combination of fundamental 
structural shocks and a split among the ruling elite, policies that lead to crisis and during 
crises ultimately benefi t the power elite, even if on the surface they seem to reduce elite 
power to the benefi t of non-elites (e. g. welfare policies). Ultimately, Domhoff ’s thesis is not 
particularly complicated: elites use both institutional and family capital (economic, cul-
tural, social) to maintain collective identity and cohesion, to mobilize eff orts to act on their 
interests, and to prevail in political confl icts with the state or other classes (for example, in 
breaking trade unions or reducing taxes and regulations). For Domhoff , elite power is not 
automatic, but rather historically contingent on the relative resources, cohesion, and power 
of the elite, the state, and other classes involved. In countries with a tradition of stronger, 
centralized states, then the power elite might not always be victorious, as they might not 
have control over discourse or fi nance: for example, signifi cant investment comes from the 
state, and the state has its own in-house technocrats and analysts for formulating policy 
and shaping public discourse. Important for us is that the more powerful the economic elite 
and power elite, the more likely that crisis and post-crisis policies will serve their interests 
over those of other groups: for example, crisis policies will aim to bail out banks and other 
important organizations, while maintaining low taxes and regulations on corporate income 
and practice. Wealth will be redistributed from the 99% to the 1% in such a scenario. How-
ever, we should be careful not to presume that one type of policies automatically means 
one type of causal relations: a country might have austerity policies not because of a strong 
economic elite, but because austerity ideology dominates state technocrats. Th e infl uence 
of the elite must be traced empirically.
5. Propositions of Field Th eory and Political Economy
Propositions from the debate between Keynesians and austerians are fairly 
straightforward: compare rates of growth across countries or sites with diff erent degrees 
of austerity or stimulus. Yet this is variation at a large scale, through mechanisms not well 
understood or, at best, hypothesized (or imagined). Variation between countries with 
similar policy approaches (austerity or stimulus) might reveal more about the role of 
institutions and institutional confi gurations. For sake of discussion and further research, I 
suggest a few propositions one could derive from the variants of fi eld theory and political 
economy that I discussed earlier.
1. Th e more integrated various fi elds are, the more likely contagion will spread — but 
conceptions of control within fi elds can further facilitate contagion or restrict it, not only 
through actual or resource conditions, but also through similar assumptions and models of 
how to respond.
If Fligstein [1990] is correct, one facet of fi elds has similar perceptions of risk and 
opportunist and similar strategies of responses and structures. Th e present “conception 
of control” in the American economy is the shareholder conception of control, in which 
the fundamental criterion of normality is short-term share value of fi rms [Fligstein, 2008]. 
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From the explosion of the crisis on, short-term fi nancial considerations trumped all other 
considerations for policy. To continue consuming, which would have picked up demand, 
would require longer-term thinking than the present model of normal business allows. 
Rather, in a short-term view, the best approach is to sit on cash — maintaining low wag-
es and low purchases, thus perpetuating stagnation — because hoarding capital provide 
low-risk short-term responses to risks to share value. Further, increasing prominence of 
fi nancial measures has meant greater centrality of “Wall Street,” i. e. fi nancial experts and 
operators who provide ratings (measures of normality) and access to the tools and capital 
of investment. Claessens, Dell’Ariccia,  Igan, and Laeven [2010] did suggest that integra-
tion facilitated contagion of the 2008 crisis, and we can posit that more than the sudden 
evaporation of capital fl ows was at work: something was driving decisions that led to such 
evaporation. Hence, one research strategy would be to measure to what extent there has 
been increasing similarity across diff erent fi elds (production of consumer durables, high-
tech, heavy industry, etc.), and then to ascertain whether the shareholder conception of 
control remains predominant. 
Stated thus far, this proposition is America-centered, in part because neoinstitutional 
analyses are American-grown and focus on the American economy. We need not restrict 
ourselves, however. What if time horizons in a particular conception of control are long-
er-term? Historically, Germany and France had longer-term horizons because of closer 
state-business and bank-business relations: loans and fi nancing were longer-term, with a 
focus on eventual gain in market share domestically and internally [Zysman, 1983; Dobbin, 
1994]. However, the German-dominated approach within the European Union has been 
austerity: in part so that German banks could avoid further losses on loans to the Euro-
pean “south,” but also because part of conceptions of control in German fi elds focus on low 
debt or managed debt — in contrast to short-term loans given out primarily to generate 
profi t through interests, this would mean longer-term loans aimed at healthy production 
and secure market share, with bank representatives within businesses helping control the 
use of those loans — and high savings. Further, institutions of the European Union have 
created a new overarching “master fi eld” into which European countries have been slowly 
integrating [Fligstein, 2008]. However, this integration is far from complete or inevitable, as 
clashes over the proposed “European Constitution” demonstrated several years ago: French 
voters rejected it for being too neoliberal or British, while the British public likely would 
have voted against it in part for being too “Continental” — that is, the principles of a pan-
European fi eld, institutionalized through the European Union, ran afoul of fi eld principles 
and political culture of current EU members or affi  liates. Th us, within Europe we see one 
general policy approach — austerity — clashing with various lower-level policies involving 
diff erent fi elds and fi eld principles (state-centered corporatism in France, more local cor-
poratism in Germany). 
Th erefore, at present a more concrete proposition: an incomplete pan-European fi eld 
and competing lower-level fi elds have created uncertainty, contributing (with austerity) to 
stagnation. Th is could be generalized to propositions about relations between fi elds: local 
fi elds (states or provinces, specifi c sectors or markets), national fi elds (with states playing 
an important role), and trans-national fi elds (regional blocs such as the European Union or 
NAFTA, and perhaps an emerging global fi eld with the WTO and dominant economies at 
its center). Th us: the more integrated nested fi elds are, the more coherent policy responses and 
practices will be; but the more contradictions and contention exist between nested fi elds, the 
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more problematic the development, legislation, and implementation of policy responses and 
eff ectiveness will be.
Finally, we should keep in mind that policy goals, and criteria for evaluating them, 
are empirical issues that should not be presumed a priori. Much scholarship tends to pre-
sume GDP and unemployment are the best indicators of policy success — yet state leaders 
and technocrats or business elites might have interests and ideologies that diff er from this 
standard line. Th us, aims of policies should refl ect principles of economic normality in fi elds 
and practices.
2. Greater centralization of fi nancial resources around states should — presuming suf-
fi cient state capacity — lead to quicker and more resolute responses to fi nancial and monetary 
crises. Th is proposition follows from Zysman’s model of fi nancial relations and political 
economy. We expect the likes of Russian and Chinese state elites to have more technologies 
available for rapid responses, whereas economies with more decentralized structures of fi -
nancial control and fl ow will face greater diffi  culties mobilizing extraordinary policies. Cer-
tainly this seems to be the case of China and Russia versus the United States and European 
Union, and this correlates with the proposition above. Once upon a time, France could use 
state control over fi nances to stimulate its economy — but membership in the euro zone has 
made this more diffi  cult, even for a socialist president such as Hollande.
However, a rapid response need not mean an eff ective response. Th erefore, following 
Evans [1995], we could propose that the more coherent a state and the more professional and 
institutionally insulated higher-level state offi  cials and technocrats, the more eff ective public 
policy should be. Some potential measures for testing this proposition could be measures 
of educational level and experience of ministers and their immediate subordinates, as well 
as relations to political parties or economic elites, and the presence of in-house (state-run) 
think tanks and organizations for analysis and policy proposals. Further, an institutionally 
insulated state with social networks between business and technocrats should be able to craft  
more successful crisis and post-crisis policies. In this case, networks between business and 
state offi  cials or technocrats could facilitate discussion of necessary actions needed to al-
leviate crises, yet state offi  cials would be more able to pursue policies that benefi ted both 
business and the public good.
3. Economies based on craft  production will have greater fl exibility to respond to cri-
ses (all other forces noted above being equal or accounted for). Th is proposition is drawn 
from Piore and Sabel’s [1984] account of logics of production (mass versus craft ) described 
above. An initial glance at data suggest there might be something to this thesis: fi nancial 
problems aside, fundamentals of production and output in Germany and Japan remain 
fairly healthy, whereas mass production in the United States has been hurt badly or has 
recovered slowly, given that mass production is more at risk from fl uctuations in demand 
or sustained weak demand. 
4. Following Harvey’s analysis, we can propose that the logics of capitalist institutions 
will favor policies that privilege accumulation fi rst, investment second. Th us, we expect that 
policies and business practices that generate asset or other bubbles should provide a rela-
tively easier way out of crisis, and that elite actions and public policies should encourage 
bubbles and rent-seeking, rather than fundamental reforms. In fact, we should least expect 
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fundamental economic reforms in response to crisis. However, this is a ceteris parabis argu-
ment, and to be fl ip, ceteris is not always parabis. Harvey’s [2014] analysis treats capitalism 
as a general category; but political economy suggests variation across capitalist economies, 
e. g. the relative power of the state or other organized classes (e. g. trade unions). Th us, 
where states and other non-elite societal actors are well organized, we expect less an emphasis 
on rent-seeking or bubbles in crisis and post-crisis policies and practices, and more emphasis 
on redistribution. However, where non-elites are less well organized, we expect elites to favor 
rent-seeking or similar policies that have a greater probability of being enacted. Th e rent-
seeking behavior of American Wall Street elites or Russian siloviki and oligarchs should be 
refl ected in policies of these countries, where non-elites have been pacifi ed. We expect that 
in other countries with stronger civil societies, rent-seeking and similar behavior will be 
less supported by public policies — even if austerity is the general logic of crisis and post-
crisis policies.
5. Following Domhoff ’s basic framework, we could propose that the more powerful 
the economic elite, the more likely crisis and post-crisis policies will benefi t the elite — even 
if they do not benefi t the vast majority of the population. We could use various measures to 
test this proposition without risking tautology (i. e. policies that benefi t the elite must be a 
sign of elite power). First, we could propose that the worse a country’s Gini coeffi  cient, the 
more likely a power elite will have disproportionate resources and infl uence over policy. A 
second proposition would focus on state structure and echo earlier claims and propositions 
of political economy: the more centralized a state, the more power a political or state elite 
will have, and thus the more diffi  culty the economic elite will have realizing their interests in 
public policy. A corollary proposition would be that the more decentralized a state, the great-
er infl uence an economic elite should have over policy. Th is is because decentralized states 
are likely to be less coherent, and diff erent branches and levels of government would face 
more diffi  culty mobilizing resources against a smaller and more unifi ed power elite. Finally, 
we return to another proposition from political economy that can operate in Domhoff ’s 
framework, namely, the more techniques and technologies a state has — more coherent and 
developed structure and use of resources — the less likely a power elite will have predominant 
infl uence over policy. A centralized state with control over fi nances can use public works, 
rather than monetary policy, to improve employment and aggregate demand; this would 
spread resources across society, rather than risk their concentration among fi nancial and 
other elites and their institutions.
One potential problem with propositions generated from Domhoff ’s power elite 
framework is that it elite structure and power are only a potential for infl uence, and thus 
elite success is contingent not only on structural (class) relations, but also on actual politics 
of confrontation, alliances, and actions. Weak leadership either by economic or political 
elites could lead to diff erent trajectories. Th is said, we could use a few indicators to aid us 
in making predictions.
6. Conclusion: Troubled Th eory and a Troubling Future aft er the Crisis
Th ese propositions do not inspire confi dence. Harvey suggests crises are recurring, 
and exiting a capitalist crisis requires new technologies for profi t — but with environmental 
crisis upon us, the capitalist model might no longer be a pathway to stable prosperity. To 
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those who follow Minsky, recovery will lead to overconfi dence, risk, and crisis again. While 
Krugman’s neo-Keynesianist model admits ways out of crisis — either eventual slow recov-
ery with plenty of pain, or more radical solutions elites are not likely to try (for reasons of 
interests and ideologies) — in blog posts he has also echoed Stanley Fisher’s worries that 
we might have entered a period of perpetual stagnation. With slow demographic growth, 
productivity and technology gains will not be enough to maintain stable growth, which will 
rely increasingly on bubble economies — and bubbles burst. Field theory suggests that, at 
least for the moment, conceptions of normal business practice that focus on short-term 
maximum fi nancial gain (at the expense of concern with output, risk, or welfare) will con-
tinue to support bubble economies and short-term fi xes rather than fundamental structural 
and institutional reforms. Until fi eld rules shift , we will repeat this history. Finally, the dis-
mantling of welfare policies and restraints on the pursuit of profi t and capital mobility have 
served the interests of the global elite, especially the 0,1%. Even if risky behavior, capitalist 
contradictions, and conceptions of normal practice lead to periodic crises, the neoliberal 
project of constraining states, citizens, and democratic accountability of capital have al-
lowed predatory behavior to expand unchecked. Regaining lost rights and remaking the 
neo-Keynesian balance of the post-war years will take incredible collective action across 
and within countries. Perhaps the real tragedy, paradoxically, is that the crisis of 2008 was 
not bad enough. Only the shock of long lines of the unemployed on the streets, begging or 
waiting at soup kitchens, would spur working classes, middle classes, and professionals to 
put aside neoliberal illusions of easy wealth, nationalist superiority, and racism of ethno-
centrism, and for a moment to use the power of numbers to reform institutions and policies 
that created crises since the 1970s. Th e dual specters of fascism and communism compelled 
Western elites to tolerate welfare reforms; will this history repeat itself? Alas, this is an im-
portant topic demanding a paper of its own.
If these propositions do not inspire confi dence in reality, what of mainstream eco-
nomic theory and discourse — which were supposed to be alert for economic problems 
and to provide solutions based on objective, scientifi cally verifi ed theories? Some leading 
economists (e. g. Krugman, Simon Wren-Lewis) believe basic economic theory explains 
fundamental dynamics underlying the unfolding of the crisis and shortcomings of policy 
res ponses, especially austerity measures. Other commentators are not so confi dent in the 
wisdom of the profession. In summer 2014, the blogger of unlearningeconomics.word-
press.com (who remains anonymous because, he claims plausibly, his biting critiques could 
harm his chances of obtaining a good job) ran a series of posts criticizing economists for 
weak intellectual and theoretical responses and excuses in the wake of 2008. Many in the 
profession leapt to defend economics and economists aft er 2008: economic theory worked 
well in the good times; or economies are too contingent and prediction is futile; or poli-
ticians ignore economists’ recommendations; or theories still provide useful tools, even 
if economists do not always wield them well. Yet as this anonymous blogger documents, 
these defenses were weak: a theory that works well in booms but misses the busts is at best 
incomplete and at worst useless; inability to predict either renders economics as a science 
worthless or requires fundamental rethinking of “theory” (a problem plaguing all social 
science); laissez-faire policies that led to crisis were rationalized by much economic theory 
and discourse; and many supposedly useful tools were complicated formulations of rules 
of thumb that had been verifi ed by real practice for fi ft y years or more. Th ese criticisms are 
well-founded, and they are not original: most echo criticisms from economic sociology and 
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political science. Th e crisis of 2008 and problematic policy recommendations — and bitter 
divides within the Anglo-American part of this profession — suggest that economic theory 
required fundamental rethinking: not only specifi c components and claims of theories, but 
even fundamental assumptions and methods.
Th is does not mean economics as we understand it should surrender to political sci-
ence and economic sociology. Th e propositions I provided here suggest there is much 
to mine from these two fi elds, but there remains much work to do as well — in particu-
lar, escaping a “pathos of powerlessness” that seems to pervade much sociology. Further, 
while Anglo-American scholarship has dominated discourse, there is much to learn from 
French, German, Japanese, and Russian scholarship (among others). Th ese traditions have 
a greater appreciation for history and institutions, and even power and culture. Being 
outside the hegemonic powers of the United Kingdom (nineteenth century) and United 
States (twentieth century), scholars in these other countries have not always assumed that 
political culture and institutions of the Anglo-American hegemons are universal. Eco-
nomic theory does need to expand its intellectual and methodological horizons to incor-
porate the likes of class, power, culture, and institutions. If the crisis of 2008 and problems 
of recapturing the genie of growth have raised doubts about infallibility and shown the 
need for rethinking, then non-economists and economists from other countries need to 
engage this issue more seriously themselves. At least, this would be the optimistic sce-
nario — in contrast to an ending where history repeats itself as farce, or worse, as tragedy.
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